How to reverse in a one-way street. Egmont Paper 114 7 September 2021. by Franco, Marc
HOW TO REVERSE 
IN A ONE WAY-STREET
MARC FRANCO (editor)
The present publication is the result of a restricted webinar, organized by the
EGMONT Institute and the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The event took place on Tuesday 25 May. The text is published in parallel by the two
institutions.
Marc Franco (editor)
Senior Associate Fellow EGMONT
ABOUT THE EGMONT PAPERS
The Egmont Papers are published by Egmont – The Royal Institute for International
Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an inde-
pendent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a
spirit of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for
debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics,
Egmont’s ambition – through its publications, seminars and recommendations – is to
make a useful contribution to the decision-making process.
1
L ist  of  intervent ions  and contr i but ions
INTRODUCTION – WELCOMING REMARKS by
1. Ambassador Hugues Chantry, Director General of EGMONT. . . . . . 2
2. Ambassador Alexander Tokovinin, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of 
Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FIRST SESSION
3. Sven Biscop, Director Europe in the World – EGMONT, Gent 
University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Alexey Gromyko, Director Institute of Europe/Russian Academy of 
Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Alexander Mattelaer, Senior Research Fellow – EGMONT, Brussels 
University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Yevgeny Primakov, Head Russotrudnichestvo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Marc Franco, Senior Associate Fellow - EGMONT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
SECOND SESSION
8. Roman Lunkin, Deputy Director Institute of Europe, Russian 
Academy of Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Mark Entin, MGIMO, Chairman of the Council of the Russian 
Association of European Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Fabienne Bossuyt, Gent University.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. Olga Butorina, Deputy Director, Institute of Europe, Russian 
Academy of Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. David Criekemans, Antwerp University, Utrecht University, Geneva 
University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13. Tatiana Romanova, St. Petersburg State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
14. Ria Laenen, Leuven University (contribution not included)
15. Elena Alekseenkova, Leading Research Fellow Institute of Europe, 
Russian Academy of Sciences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
16. Laura Vansina, Brussels University  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
BIOGRAPHIES OF SPEAKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR 
H. CHANTRY, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
EGMONT INSTITUTE
Ambassador Hugues Chantry, Director General of EGMONT
As host of this conference organized in close cooperation with the Institute of Europe
of the Russian Academy of Sciences it is great pleasure to welcome Ambassador
Tokovinin, Director Gromyko, and all the distinguished participants in todays discus-
sion.
I want to thank Director Alexey Gromyko for the excellent collaboration as well as
Vera Bunina, Director of the Russian Centre in Brussels. Without Veras active engage-
ment and support it would have been impossible to organize this conference.
Our cooperation with the Institute of Europe started more than five years ago. 
We have jointly organized successful yearly seminars in Moscow and in Brussels. We
have published several joint studies. Last year we agreed on a joint publication, also
involving Chinese and US political scientists, on the theme “Bidens World? Views
from the United States, China, Russia and the European Union”. We are working on
an analytical summary of analysis and forecasts, that we will share with you soon. It
will be interesting to see to what extent the analysis and predictions formulated by
the six experts reflect reality when we read them again in the autumn of this year,
one year after they have been written.
As far as todays seminar is concerned, the starting point is the bad relations between
EU and Russia. We seem to be sleepwalking in a continuously worsening situation. Is
this unavoidable or can we imagine scenarios with small (or big?) steps that allow the
two parties “to climb down the tree together” or to quote the title of the conference:
“to reverse in a one-way street” where we seem to find ourselves.
Of course, many seminars have been organized on this theme, and many speakers
have addressed the issues. But the usual approach is to outline the steps the other
side has to take in order to unblock the situation. We have chosen in this seminar to
reverse the argumentation and we ask speakers to take the position of the opposite
party and to imagine the steps their own government could take in order to reverse
the trend towards worsening.
We have succeeded in bringing together an excellent panel of experts and I am confi-
dent that we will come up with some “out of the box”-suggestions
Because this is delicate matter, we have decided to keep the participation of the
conference limited to the speakers and commentators. Of course, very strict2
HOW TO REVERSE IN A ONE WAY-STREETChatham House Rules apply to the proceedings in order to allow all speakers to
express themselves in all freedom.
I wish you success with your discussions and I am looking forward to listening to the
debates and the solutions that will be formulated.3
2. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY H.E. 
A. TOKOVININ, AMBASSADOR OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE KINGDOM OF 
BELGIUM
Ambassador Alexander Tokovinin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of Belgium
It is really a pleasure to address the new session of the dialogue between the Insti-
tute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont Institute in Brus-
sels.
The regularity with which these sessions are organized is encouraging. When I came
to Brussels, one of my bright impressions was the participation in a session like this
where I heard a lot of constructive ideas. Some of them were far-reaching, and they
were expressed on both sides. I think this format helps to generate positive ideas
both for the Russian-Belgian relations and for the overall situation in Europe.
Unfortunately, in recent months and years, the developments have been taking a
rather negative direction, but that does not mean that we should shut the channels
of dialogue and stop talking. On the contrary, I believe that in a difficult situation we
should be talking more, we should be searching even more actively and energetically
for ways to overcome the impasse.
And in doing so, I don’t think we should be discussing the question of who must pay
what price for what, but rather try to provide creative approaches to the develop-
ment of our common continent, because the basic facts remain the same. Russia and
the European Union are two major actors on the European continent, and they stand
to benefit much more from their cooperation than from a confrontational posture.
I do believe that this session of the dialogue will be conducive to providing new
impetus for turning the tide of events in the right direction and for understanding
that, against the background of rapid changes that we witness in Europe and in the
world, we do need to think big, to think strategically and to search for common
responses to common challenges.4
3. INTERVENTION BY SVEN BISCOP, DIRECTOR 
“EUROPE IN THE WORLD” EGMONT 
INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF GENT
Sven Biscop, Director Europe in the World – EGMONT, Gent University
As Chairman of the first session of this conference, I first want to thank H.E. Toko-
vinin, Ambassador of Russia and the Director General of EGMONT, Ambassador
Chantry, for their welcome address. They mentioned the importance of this confer-
ence and let me just underline how rare it is that in one format experts from Russia
and the EU together discuss this sensitive topic of EU-Russia relations. Not only poli-
ticians but also political scientists have the bad habit to stay in their own echo
chamber. This conference is one of the rare occasions when experts get out of their
own comfort zone.
As Chairman it is not my task to present my own views, it is my task to prepare the
platform for the speakers to make their contributions. The context of the conference
has already been alluded to by the two Ambassadors.
There is not much joy in EU-Russia relations or in relations between Russia and the
West in general. Judging by recent events, relations seem to be set to worsen rather
than improve. Diplomatic initiatives end up in incidents, and diplomatic communica-
tion in shouting matches, while military posturing is not really a sign that constructive
engagement is being considered and direct and indirect interference in the domestic
politics of the other side envenoms the relationship.
In the end, all sides have a basic interest in improving relations and in active
economic and political cooperation, but many leaders seem to be guided by short-
term political and electoral calculations rather than by long-term perspectives. Even
academics and other experts seem to be caught up in the dominant narrative of their
own side and appear less and less capable of formulating non-partisan analysis and
proposals. But: it is innovative proposals that are needed to get out of the conflict
atmosphere and avoid that the world “sleepwalks” into a major crisis.
We propose to take up this challenge: in a restricted webinar, among selected
experts, we launch a reflection, “out of the box”, to explore what initiatives could
possibly initiate a process of choreographed “climbing down the tree together”.
In this session, 2+2 speakers would each make a maximum 8-minute introduction. To
start a constructive exchange of views, it could be agreed that every speaker concen-
trates on steps that his side could take as a first step, indicating what steps from the
other side could then be expected to lead to a process of des-escalation.5
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Institute of Europe, 4+4 experts are invited to comment on the proposals made and
add their assessment of their feasibility and effectiveness.
The conference is short, at this stage there is no time for a more thorough discussion.
It will be very useful to organize such a follow discussion, perhaps in combination
with a discussion of the papers that we published together with the Institute of
Europe with a more geopolitical focus “Bidens world? Views from the United States,
China, Russia and the European Union”. We intend to glean ideas and proposals of
that publication and of todays presentations and submit it to an (hopefully life)
conference in the autumn.6
4. INTERVENTION BY DR. ALEXEY GROMYKO, 
DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF EUROPE (RUSSIAN 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES),  CORRESPONDING 
MEMBER (RAS), PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION 
OF EUROPEAN STUDIES (RUSSIA)
Alexey Gromyko, Director Institute of Europe/Russian Academy of Sciences
Ripples in a Pond
The state of affairs in the relationship between Russia and the European Union is
dismal. Probably it is in its worst shape since the end of the Cold War. The reasons
are many as well as pretexts and unrelated factors.
Russia felt that its interests were neglected, and the chain of events distorted by the
West’s attitude to the events in August 2008 in Georgia and in February 2014 in
Ukraine. Brussels believes that in both cases Russia was the culprit and aggressor. As
in Iraq, Russia was against the “liberal” intervention in Libya but later the West
accused Russia of murky activities inside this dysfunctional state. Russia is proud of
crushing ISIS and other terrorists’ groups in Syria, but the West has been accusing
Russia of supporting despotism. Moscow is adamant that Alexey Navalnyi was not
poisoned on the territory of Russia, but the West blames it for attempts to assassi-
nate political opponents. Moscow says that recent accusations against Russia in the
Czech Republic are ridiculous, but Brussels calls for solidarity with Prague. More than
60 countries have concluded agreements with Russia on the “Sputnik V” vaccine, but
in the EU there are strong arguments against it as an instrument of Russias neo-
imperialist policies.
The list of such mutual incriminations seems endless, complaints and finger pointing
are abound.
One way to explain this situation is to proclaim the objective nature of the present
stand-off and accept it as given and intractable. And do nothing. However, in my
opinion, the situation is not natural, moreover it runs counter to common sense, not
to mention professional assessment. Economically, culturally, technologically and
even politically there are much fewer fundamental cleavages between Russia and
the EU, then these days many people think. In recent years differences between the
two sides have been extremely exaggerated for the sake of tactical political gains.
Russia and the EU were not mentally inept or adolescent when for quite a while they
pursued the policy of strategic engagement and partnership. This strategy was
buttressed by strong economic, investment and security interests and by a dense
fabric of institutions. Alas, even challenges of international terrorism or the current7
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only deteriorating.
What went wrong? There are several explanations. The one is the state in world
politics, which in the past years and even decades have been working not only on
convergence but on divergence of regional and global players. By now, decoupling
has turned into a household expression. It is now intrinsic, in different forms, to the
relations between the USA and China, the USA and Europe, the EU and the UK, China
and India, in the relations among some states in the post-Soviet space. There are
numerous malfunctions in the development of the United States, the EU, Russia, the
Middle East, North Africa and Sahel and the plethora of other countries and multilat-
eral bodies.
International relations have stuck in the phase of rebalancing, as it happened many
times in history. Each time this phase led to the rise in tension and conflicts.
Currently, we witness numerous manifestations of de-globalization, of protec-
tionism, sometimes in disguise of new industrial and technological strategies, of
attempts to consolidate itself at the expense of others.
The EU is much more multi-dimensional in comparison to nation-states. This circum-
stance entails advantages as well as weaknesses. Bilateral relations of Russia with
different member-states of the EU and relations of Russia with the supranational
structures of the EU are two distinctive tracks, which of course intensely overlap.
Along bilateral tracks the situation is multi-speed reflecting a wide range of opinions
and interests of different EU member-states. The most problematic is relationship
between Russia and the official structures of the EU.
Keeping in mind the current situation, we need “ripples from pebbles cast into a
pond” much more than some new mega projects to salvage what is left of strategic
cooperation and cooperation as such. In other words, we need small steps and incre-
mental changes to try to bring about de-escalation.
In this regard Nord Stream 2 for a near future is better to leave as the last mega
project between Russia and the EU. Until the geopolitical storm subsides, it would be
unwise to launch something similar, which may quickly fall prey to entrenched
misperceptions. Many experts even suggest that Moscow and Brussels should put
the relationship on pause and stop paying attention to each other until more lucid
minds come to the fore. However, if we do nothing than we will be engulfed by more
regrettable developments harming both sides.
I would borrow a couple of terms from the military vocabulary. One is a “tale chase”
meaning a military target and a vehicle pursuing it in order to destroy. In case of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is very difficult to tale chase them. So instead of
trying to do almost the impossible it is better to let the geopolitical missiles, which
have already been launched (some landed and some not yet), to inflict their damage.8
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ability for something doable in the EU – Russia interaction, preparing ground for a
“day after”.
Another term from the military vocabulary is the “upload potential” — something
that can be restored quickly. Indeed, many mechanisms of cooperation were put on
hold, but it does not mean that they were destroyed. The same applies to relations
between Russia and NATO. Hopefully, in the foreseeable future some of these
mechanisms will be in demand again and we do not need to reinvent them.
For the time being, I do not see what may reignite the EU – Russia relations from
within, especially after the collapse of the German-French proposal at the July EU
summit to invite Vladimir Putin to Brussels. But there are rays of hope from outside:
firstly, it is the impulse due to Putin – Biden’s talks in Geneva, and secondly, the
summit of P5 states (permanent members of the UN Security Council), which is now
again quite likely.
What other pebbles can Russia cast into a pond? I will point out at least three of
them. Russia can use its chairmanship in the Arctic council to promote a positive
agenda. Six member-states of the EU are observers in this important international
organization. Russia can use the EU Green Deal in order to try to find common
ground with the EU instead of letting it become one more apple of discord. Russia’s
role in the future of the Iran nuclear deal and in the future of Afghanistan can be
points of convergence with the EU.
In conclusion, I would like briefly to touch upon a notion of solidarity. I understand
perfectly well how important this principle is. However, it is counterproductive to
devalue it to esprit de corps, to the lowest common denominator. Quite often
Russians hear from the EU colleagues that it takes two to tango. However, there are
27 members of the EU and for Russia it will always be impossible to tango with all of
them at once.
When for domestic or other reasons one of the EU member-states does something
provocative and unsubstantiated towards Russia, to express solidarity with such
actions and as a sideshow act to throw away Russian diplomats is to betray the
meaning of solidarity, not to reinforce it. More often such events happen, less
numerous is the community of Russians who believe in the normative power of the
European Union and in its ability to pursue fair play.9
5. INTERVENTION BY ALEXANDER MATTELAER, 
SENIOR RESEARCHER EGMONT, BRUSSELS 
UNIVERSITY
Alexander Mattelaer, Senior Research Fellow – EGMONT, Brussels University
Europe-Russia Relations: Reciprocity Is Key
Europe-Russia relations are caught in a paradox. From a European perspective, it is
perfectly possible to have ample respect for the artful diplomacy of the Russian
Federation and great sympathy for the Russian people, and at the same time worry
that the Russian regime is treating Europeans as adversaries. To be convinced that
there is little to be gained from conflict, does not mean that conflict is inconceivable.
The recent visit by the European High Representative Josep Borrell to Moscow shows
that such concerns are increasingly widespread. Indeed, European policy communi-
ties are becoming convinced of the notion that they are Russia’s adversary – for the
simple reason that Russia treats them as such. In this respect European policies are
largely articulated on the basis of a reactive mindset (unlike the more pro-active
policies of the US). Against this background, one may wonder what the purpose of is
“improving relations”. If the price of improved relations is acquiescence, then
improving relations is arguably increasing the risk of conflict yet to come. The
question at hand is what Europeans themselves could do to escape this paradox. This
essay proposes four hypotheses addressing this question. Unsurprisingly, the overall
conclusion is that reciprocity is key.
Firstly, Europeans could be much more self-critical of their own policies. Cheer-
leading the European project is commonplace in European policy-circles. This carries
the risk that European policies tend to become self-congratulatory. The European
Eastern Partnership arguably constitutes a case in point. Being convinced that
European integration is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself, has led many
to believe that the geographical expansion of the European project is preordained
and therefore cannot know any logical limits or geographical boundaries. Such
European self-righteousness cannot help but intrude on the geography and
psychology of the Russian state. Against this background, the waiving of European
flags on Maidan Square cannot be seen as anything else as the geopolitical expansion
of the European project all the way to Russia’s doorstep.
Secondly, European leaders would do well to speak truthfully and candidly in order
to avoid further confusion entering the relations with Moscow. In particular, this
relates to the core message that if the vital interests of any EU member state (or any
NATO ally) are at stake, Europeans will stand united. This is also the reason why many
member states are currently in the process of hardening the policies vis-à-vis
Moscow. In effect, their allegiance to the spirit of solidarity and consensus within the10
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tions. The swift coordination of European reactions against the brazen Belarussian
act of intercepting Ryanair flight 4978 highlighted that Europeans will come to the
aid of the weakest and most vulnerable member states.
Thirdly, Europeans must aspire to avert conflict by recognizing that conflict is not
impossible. This is an important philosophical point. Signaling that there is nothing to
be gained from conflict is important for influencing cost benefit calculations. Yet for
such messages to be conveyed credibly the messenger must truly believe conflict to
be a real possible outcome, albeit one that needs to be averted. In this respect it is
precisely the underestimation of conflict that has allowed Europeans to inadvert-
ently increase the risk thereof, namely by not taking this prospect seriously enough.
In many ways taking the risk of conflict seriously boils down to the same as taking the
Russian Federation itself seriously. This point also relates to the artificial separation
between economic and security policies, which is widespread in EU policy-making
and an important component of careless international policy. In fact, Europeans
would have much learn from Russia’s skills in coordinating actions across different
policy domains.
Fourthly, Europeans can sympathize with Russia’s predicament of being squeezed
between its western and south-eastern flanks. That is to say: with Russia being
caught in between the emerging bipolarity between the United States and China.
Indeed, this is something which Europeans and Russia have in common, allowing
them to compare their respective experiences. In this regard Europeans can signal
they are allied with (or partners of) the United States by choice, meaning they are
free to disagree with Washington when needed or when appropriate. The 2003 war
in Iraq – the last major crisis in which Paris, Berlin and Moscow were operating fully
in sync – bears witness to this. In the context of brewing Sino-American rivalry,
Europeans can only hope that Russian authorities will have choices available as well
in order to avoid geopolitical entrapment. Europeans would do well to bear in mind
that from a Russian point of view, geography may well play in its favor in its Western
Military District, but surely not in its Eastern Military District.
At heart, the discussion about improving Europe-Russia relations boils down to the
question under what conditions this becomes feasible. It is perfectly natural for the
Russian regime to insist on being treated with respect, in particular when its core
political and security interests are at stake. This argument goes in both directions,
however, even when it concerns small neighboring countries. In its defensive self-
conception – as opposed to its ideology-driven counterpart – the European construc-
tion is precisely geared to protect the weak from the strong and to constrain the
operation of Realpolitik on the European continent. In that sense, the only situation
in which Brussel-based decision-making does not feature genuine options is
whenever the fundamental interests of any member state are being put into11
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logic. This means that Moscow must treat all European capitals with the same defer-
ence it would like to be treated with in return. As ever, reciprocity is key.12
6. INTERVENTION BY EVGENY PRIMAKOV, HEAD 
OF RUSSOTRUDNICHESTVO
Yevgeny Primakov, Head Russotrudnichestvo
Many mark 2014 as the starting point of the current cooling between Russia and
Europe – crisis in Ukraine, return of Crimea to the Russian Federation – in Russia it is
called “the reunification with Crimea”, after the referendum was held there on this
issue. In 2014, the Crimean referendum was the result of a coup d’état in Ukraine. In
Europe, this referendum and its reasons are called differently, which does not alter
the essence of this event: a violent overthrow of the government in Kiev.
However, the cooling began back in 2007 – when Russian President Vladimir Putin,
speaking at the Munich Security Conference, noted the constant outside interfer-
ence in Russian national interests, which threatens Russias security.
Not a single country of the European Union wants to exacerbate relations with
Moscow, said Josep Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, at a press conference after the meeting of the EU Council in Brussels on May
10, 2021, which was attended by foreign ministers of the 27 member states.
However, Brussels may be pushed to further strain relations through Euro-solidarity,
which some states are taking advantage of. Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš
recently called on all EU members to expel “at least one Russian diplomat” because
of the 2014 bombing of Czech ammunition depots, which seven years later, in 2021,
was suddenly blamed on Russia.
Such a “retrospective” approach to the events history – as well as all historical events
– can lead to even more radical conclusions – as, for example, when Poland declared
that the USSR was to blame for the outbreak of World War II and even, some voices
are being heard – the Holocaust. The danger of this “crisis of old Europe” is that
“Young Europeans” now seek to rewrite history and then will proceed to rewrite
reality and the future. The reason for this “transition” of meanings is that the most
powerful industrial and military force in the world, the U.S., is behind it. The
“rewriting of history” has never been a purely scientific exercise, but it has always
been and remains a tool for politics in the future, a justification for that politics, and
politics is determined by economics.
One of these new “economic fronts,” besides the economic confrontation with
China, runs through the countries of “new Europe” – Poland and the Baltics, which
purchase liquefied gas from the United States at the highest price, as long as this gas
contains “freedom molecules”. I wonder how much pressure Germany is under on
the gas issue and to what extent the U.S. does not fear a split on the continent along
the lines of “old” and “new” Europe. Isnt this the clearest manifestation of the
planned future political shift on the continent?13
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scientist Alexander Rahr, members of the German government, including Angela
Merkel, have already begun to realize that the “Young Europeans” do not want any
positive dynamics with Russia, artificially imposing Russophobia on the European
population through controlled media resources, which have long ago betrayed the
principle of independence and impartiality and became active participants of the
ordered anti-Russian agenda.
However, despite the low level of political and economic relations, Russia and the EU
continue to cooperate in the cultural, educational, and scientific areas.
An example would be the relations with Germany. Our countries share fundamental
values, such as a memory of the great and terrible war. The current German identity,
like the Russian one, is based on this memory and the desire to preserve peace. In
Russia we take into account these fundamental values. Despite our tragic past, we
are grateful to Germany for not destroying our monuments on their territory, and for
taking care of Russian burial sites. Germany did not adhere to the European Parlia-
ment resolution which places equal blame on the Soviet Union and Germany for the
outbreak of World War II, and this is one of the bases for building a dialogue.
Another relevant point of cooperation for both Russia and Europe would be health-
care. The “ vaccine diplomacy “ plays a crucial role today.
Russia was the first country to create a vaccine against coronavirus, Sputnik V.
However, later drugs – AstraZeneca, Pfizer and others – have already been approved
by the World Health Organization and relevant European structures, unlike the
Russian vaccine. This is a strange, but very revealing situation, in which we under-
standably see political overtones. It is not a politicization coming from our part, but
we believe it exists. For us, the vaccine is a way to save lives, thanks to some signifi-
cant medical technology developed in Russia.
Combating climate change and “green energy” may also become the most important
area of cooperation between Russia and the EU, as the Russian President Vladimir
Putin indicated in his speech during the SPIEF.
Today Russia is not only a country of great past, but also of present, due to modern
technologies in IT, medicine, scientific research, Rosatom projects. Moreover, the
ideological basis is also important – traditional democracy, fair rules of the interna-
tional game, and security is what we offer the world today.
Humanitarian policy in general should not be perceived as some kind of aggressive
expansion. The great Russian culture that is known, understood and welcomed in
Europe. It also provides a space for dialogue as culture sets the norms of a peaceful
life. The same is true for education, which in times of crisis remains a territory of
interaction and mutual development.14
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which could be an excellent platform for interaction with our country, with Russian
public organizations and universities, Russian regions – from cultural and humani-
tarian projects to business ones. We are also happy to work on regional initiatives,
including those dedicated to the economy.
We live in a common information space, so preserving the world and saving us all
from a disaster is the main goal of modern communications. And the key element is
not just supporting, but initiating any contacts and negotiations, any consultations
aimed at reducing tensions and the new “detente” and release.15
7. INTERVENTION BY MARC FRANCO, SENIOR 
ASSOCIATE FELLOW, EGMONT INSTITUTE
Marc Franco, Senior Associate Fellow - EGMONT
The moment for our discussion is well chosen. Yesterday and today the EU-Russia
relations were on the agenda of the European Council. This week minister Lavrov is
visiting a number of EU Member States (Greece, Malta, Slovenia, Portugal). In a
recent interview Ambassador Chizov stressed the importance of contacts and discus-
sions at higher level and High Representatieve Borrell also mentioned in an interview
that the EU is ready to engage in areas of where we have a shared interest.
However, although talking the talk, at this moment, no side is ready to walk the walk,
on the contrary. Over the years since 2014 (and even before) a formidable list of
complaints and accusations have been built up against Russia: for its external policy
(Ukraine, Syria, interference in western countrys political systems…) as well as for its
domestic policy (measures making opposition virtually impossible, trend towards
totalitarian regime…). Yesterdays European Council conclusion “condemns the
illegal, provocative and disruptive Russian activities against the EU, its Member
States and beyond”, postponed the planned discussion on Russia to the June
meeting and invites the HR and the Commission “to present a report with policy
options”.
Speaking from the changed perspective (in my case: what can EU do to unblock the
situation) is not easy as the general mood in the EU is certainly not for making first
steps. The recent events with thew Ryanair plane in Belarus although not directly
implicating Russia is certainly not contributing to the improvement of relationships
as Russia has spoken in defense of the Belarusian action accusing the West of hypoc-
risy with a classical “what about” argument.
Let me nevertheless try the difficult task and explore, in line with HRs Borrells remark
about the readiness to engage in areas of shared interest, how possibly we could
reverse the tendencies of worsening situation.
In the first place, there are some issues on which EU and Russia do not disagree and
at least seem to be looking in the same direction for solutions: JCPOA and climate.
EU could consider putting the more substantial divergences “between brackets” and
more actively engage with Russia at an appropriate political level. Even Bidens US
could be part of a constructive dialogue. The confidence created by working together
could lead to an unfreezing of the other more fundamental issues.
Secondly, for the EU, more than for the US, economic relations with Russia are a key
factor. EU-Russia trade is about 8 times bigger than US-Russia trade and EU invest-
ment is about 2/3 of total inward Russian FDI. Relations continue (but slacken)
despite the diplomatic rift because Member States, and their companies, move16
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the relationship. EU is mainly important when negotiations are taken place. Once an
agreement is concluded the implementation is a matter of Member States and their
companies to act upon. For the EU, stopping negotiations is a form of “cutting your
nose to spite your face”. In order to get back its place in the relationship, EU could
take steps to relaunch the negotiations. Here again, putting the conflict provisionally
“between brackets” and explore how a political dialogue could start again. A possi-
bility is launching negotiations with the Eurasian Economic Union. This is a fairly easy
step that can also easily be reversed if no adequate steps from the Russian side were
made in response. Engaging with the EAEU at a political level could be a step that
creates confidence and can lead to further de-escalation.
Thirdly, what about the main conflict (Donbas and Crimea) itself? When asked what
should be done on the Russian side, the simple answer on the EU side is: “implement
the Minsk agreements”. Perhaps the EU could again a look at the agreement and
recognize that also on the Ukrainian side the implementation has not been perfect.
The special status of Donbas in a Ukrainian federation has not really been adequately
handled by the Ukrainian side and the “Steinmeier formula” has perhaps been too
rapidly put in the bottom drawer. Proposals for an intermission force have perhaps
been too rapidly discarded because of the divergence of view on how, where and
who. There is perhaps scope for compromises if each side puts some pressure on the
local allies. Apart from a possible improvement in relations between EU and Rusia,
the local population would gain substantially.
Finally, there is another possible route leading to new contacts and negotiation. The
EU position has to a large extent followed the US position vis a vis Russia. The first
geopolitical priority of the EU at this moment is getting its transatlantic relations back
in order. EU position vis a vis China and Russia, will at least take some inspiration
from the US position. If the planned talks between Biden and Putin next month in
Switzerland result in some form of “normalisation” of relationships between the US
and Russia, a spin-off effect of this evolution on the EU position is not excluded.
Whereas prudent steps seem possible at the international relations between EU and
Russia., it is more difficult to imagine how to treat the internal situation, with Russian
policies getting more and more restricting and repressive. Perhaps it could be
explored how a dialogue on the internal erosion of democracy and respect of rights
of assembly, of expression etc. could take place in the Council of Europe. Russia is a
member and the argument “what about” (the situation in Hungary, Poland possibly
Slovenia) cannot be used.17
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The latest discussions around the problems between Russia and West, Russia and EU
demonstrate that the cooperation with Russian Federation is not the narrow one-
way road for both sides. And also, impossible to imagine that it could be so though
the war of sanctions makes the Russia-European road more narrow. That’s why it’s
important to change first of all the psychological atmosphere of Russia-EU relations
in the new post-covid world.
European leaders and certainly the officials of European Commission have to under-
stand that the political differences of Russia and mainly Western Europe have natural
cultural and historical background. That differences will follow our dialogue in the
nearest and in a far future and ever. European values in their current interpretation
inside liberal democracy are not ideal values for Russia but they are inadequate not
only for Russian state and society. Almost half of the global world including signifi-
cant part of the society in Central and Eastern Europe rejecting so called “western
values” (radical interpretation of political correctness and rights of minorities, anti-
democratic exclusion of traditionalist political forces from public sphere). Large part
of the inhabitants of Europe treated Russia as a symbol of traditional values, identity,
sovereignty that stands against liberal West (see the polls of Pew Research Center on
Religious belonging and national identity in Europe). This new role of Russia – the
informal symbol of traditionalism in Eurasia. There are no any reasons to interpret
this fact as informational campaign of Kremlin or as only the features of “right
populism”. Political ideas on sovereignty and identity are the base for serious talks
among experts because it’s hardly possible to avoid such tendencies in societies in
the major part of the countries in a world where the values of liberal democracy
counter to the traditionalism and nationalism. The level of democracy and the role
of civil society are also the questions for expert conversation.
From that point of view – Russia as a space of diversity (regional, cultural, religious,
national) is the most acceptable partner for EU because the Union is also multidi-
mensional and multinational structure with many levels and speeds inside. All
attempts to make more unification in EU or to make EU Commission more powerful
failed (pandemic shows the potential for local nationalisms). The most productive
relations are between Russia and some countries members of EU. The most effective
cooperation is in the spheres where Russians feel themselves as true Europeans and
even more (culture, education, religion). Economic relations never stopped because
of mutual interests. As director of the Institute of Europe Aleksei Gromyko said there18
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cooperation in Arctic Council, Iran agreement, climate agenda etc. and opportunities
for improvement as the dialogue on status of Donbass, vaccine diplomacy. In spite of
the atmosphere of misunderstanding Russia is inevitable partner for EU and EU
member-countries. That’s why the radical changing psychology of our relations is
worth now.
Pandemic of coronavirus step by step began to change the people’s consciousness
on the community level towards solidarity in the situation when the states showed
their national egoisms and compete with each other instead of the direct support of
infected citizens. European society in general including Russian society already
showed the high level of civic solidarity facing social problems. In that sense the
solidarity is the most needed idea in a world (and certainly on a field of international
relations) that full of covid or anti-covid protests, in the situation of the increasing
social inequality not only in the poorest countries but also in the prosperous ones.
The common needs of the states and their citizens in the epoch of informational and
physical viruses are the real background for the cooperation on various levels. Politi-
cians and diplomats could replace the rhetoric of the new virtual “cold war” and
sanctions clashes by the real international solidarity. National interests combining
now with the issues of the climate change, with the ideologically motivated
extremism that still alive, with new military competitions of US-China or Russia-US.
The words of prof. Mark Entin have to be the new slogan of the new period of the
Russian-European relations – same family, same challenges.
In fact, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of EU there is a space of
multidimensional Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok where citizens (approx. one
third of them in Russia) are relatives and neighbors. They often read the same novels,
believe in the same gods and myths, ideally want to live under democratic rules, with
democratic institutes with the same civilizational background and everyday
demands. The policy of sanctions and the absence of the Russia-EU treaty lead to the
hard consequences. First of all, opponents in EU begging to ruin the current state
system in Russia (may be for good reasons but this sounds too destructive for
common citizens) and as alternative suggest the opposition that also wants primarily
to destroy the state system as Bolsheviks. Secondly, the sanctions policy strengthens
the pressure on the civil society and all societal institutes inside Russia. In the context
of this dangers European politicians and EU leadership in particular could provide
more flexible policy towards Russia.
The strategic development of the Russia-EU relations is impossible without common
language and common understanding but do not expect complete agreement in
everything. It’s impossible and not really needed in so multilateral and multidimen-
sional world in which we live. Global responsibility of post-covid world lays on the
selective solidarity and in the understanding of the fact that the states and big inter-19
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ation in some spheres for the sake of sustainable development and promotion of the
climate agenda. Sanctions or direct political pressure create only phobias that ruined
the global world around and solidarity inside the states.20
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Today we witness a very disturbing phase of international, interstate relations. They
are in transition. Our societies understand more or less well what they resembled
before. But nobody has the knowledge of how they are likely to look tomorrow.
Such a situation creates risks and challenges to all international players and political
forces. But none of them turned out to be on the level of expectations. None of them
was able to oppose these new risks and challenges with anything at all.
Neither USA, nor European Union, China or Russia managed to provide all-inclusive
leadership in solving global problems and conflict resolution because for that they
needed to closely cooperate with each other. Instead, they opted for unilateral
approaches and tried to get benefits on the expenses of others. It had a devastating
effect. Especially during the coronavirus pandemic.
It’s a pity. New technological revolution could have created a world of opportunities.
Unfortunately, they are wasted, and fair competition for the benefit of mankind is
transformed into technological wars, wars of sanctions and countersanctions, and
politics of containment.
Five principles of the EU policy towards Russia are an obvious illustration of that.
Experts from Russian side may believe that small steps in improving the EU-Russia
relations would be able to pave the way for their normalization in future. Such a logic
will lead to nowhere.
Experts from the EU side give a list of the fields where, according to them and their
countries, cooperation between Russia and the EU is feasible. The problem is that the
EU and its Member States tried to implement such an approach for about five years.
Nevertheless, bilateral relations stuck into confrontation deeper and deeper.
The reason is obvious. Until the EU abandon the policy of five principles towards
Russia no normalization of relations of any kind could be expected. Selective engage-
ment kills the spirit of cooperation. It creates conditions when for Western politicians
is safer and more promising to hide behind anti-Russian rhetoric, and for private
companies – not to expend business relations with Russian counterparts or to invest
in them.
That is why if the EU side decide one day to restore friendly, peaceful and sustainable
relations on the continent, it must start with abandoning the policy of selective
engagement and to turn around in the direction of the policy of engagement short.21
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as well. All of us needs something like the EU wide new Brandt Eastern policy.
The key problem is that the EU has no policy towards Russia. It has a policy against
Russia and thoroughly implement it.
In any case if we really want to launch a process of normalization of the EU-Russia
relations, we must start with stopping the information war that is destroying the
continent and breaking everything in its path. The EU side knows quite well that
behind all sanctions, freezing exchanges and negotiations, making demands and
accusations against Russia as well as advancing all sorts of conditions, there is an
information warfare. Reality as far as Russia is concerned (including its involvement
in Eastern Ukraine, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Belorussia, etc.) is entirely different.
But when the EU assign Russia to be an adversary it transforms Russia into an adver-
sary. This is the logic of warfare.
Let’s not forget, that though till now Russia does not behave in any case as an enemy
of the EU or as an ally of an enemy, Moscow has a huge potential to counterattack
the EU everywhere and in all dimensions. If the EU continues to cross redlines
Moscow starts to speak about, it could be used.
The second step both Russia and the EU need to make consist in creating an efficient
mechanism of preventing any country, any political force or Mass media from trans-
forming day to day contradictions into open exaggerated conflicts, especially from
inventing new cases like Litvinenko, Saulsberry, Navalny, seven years old shell explo-
sions in the Czech Republic, etc. with the purpose to hide the trough and worthen
relations any time there is an improvement, signs of détente, lifting of sanctions is
looming or the European Council is to have a debate on future policy towards Russia.
For that Moscow and Brussels must not forget that both of us – Russia and the EU –
are members of the same family of European nations and we face the same risks and
challenges. Taking that into consideration, they must behave accordingly.22
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Several developments in the past few months have shown that the EU’s relations
with Russia continue deteriorating at a rapid pace. This is of course very worrisome.
It is clear that the EU’s current policy of the five principles, which was introduced in
the wake of the crisis over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, needs to be evaluated, so
that we can have a concrete idea of what is working and what is not working in this
policy. Such evidence-based insights are urgently needed in order to re-assess the
EU’s current policy.
The book that I have recently edited with Peter Van Elsuwege “Principled Pragma-
tism in Practice: The EU’s Policy towards Russia after Crimea” (published by Brill),
which assesses the EU’s five guiding principles for relations with Russia, suggests that
a revision of the EU’s current policy will be needed in order to pursue a more effec-
tive and constructive policy towards Russia. This conclusion is finding growing
resonance among experts, who echo the need for a more strategic policy towards
Russia.
As Sabine Fischer has argued: “The guiding principles have earned praise for being
flexible and sufficiently balanced to keep on board Member States with very
different positions and interests vis-à-vis Russia. But they have also been fiercely
criticised for a lack of policy goals and strategic vision”. The contributions to our book
largely confirm this view and point at the broader paradoxes and challenges that
have characterised EU-Russia relations in recent times. Awareness of these broader
trends and features is essential if the EU and Russia want to move beyond the
lingering deadlock in their bilateral relations. The contributions offered further
insights that help to understand the dynamics underlying the worsening relationship,
which will need to be addressed to overhaul the EU’s current short-term policy
towards Russia in favour of a more constructive, long-term strategy.
First of all, the profound discord between the EU and Russia is reflected in the actors’
diverging images and perceptions, which have in turn engendered a deep-ingrained
misunderstanding and lack of trust. Diverging images and perceptions can be major
obstacles to the enhancement of relations between the EU and Russia. Hence, it is
essential to understand how these divergences have emerged and how they have
been manifested. This is important not only in order to be able to identify confi-
dence-building measures to restore trust, but also in order to develop a common
vision for cooperation between the EU and Russia.
A second factor that has impeded constructive cooperation is the mismatch between
the EU’s ambitions as a global norm-setter, which is perceived as paternalistic from23
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right. Several chapters in our book, especially by Russian authors, argued that this
mismatch lies at the basis of both the worsening relationship between the EU and
Russia and the difficulty to engage in cooperation that has manifested itself since the
2000s. Russia has no interest in cooperating with the EU if it can only be ‘a passive
consumer of EU norms’. Instead, it seeks recognition as an equal actor in today’s
multipolar world. Russia thus wants to move beyond a ‘master-pupil’ or ‘donor-
recipient’ relationship, which can be observed, among other things, in specific areas
such as higher education and transnational security threats.
So far, the EU has shown only little readiness to answer Russia’s desire for coopera-
tion on an equal footing. As one of the chapter in our book indicated, the EU’s Global
Strategy has further cemented the EU’s binary logic, whereby it asks Russia to
conform to the EU’s vision of security and cooperation, and identifies Russia as a
‘strategic challenge’ as long as it does not do so. An increasing number of scholars
have criticized this approach and are calling upon the EU to accommodate Russia’s
desire for cooperation based on an equal footing.
Last but not least, there is the lack of a common position among the Member States,
which has always been considered the Achilles’ heel of the EU’s policy towards
Russia, especially after the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The current disagreement
among the EU Member States is making it very difficult for the EU to find a way out
of the lingering impasse in its relations with Russia. EU Member States remain deeply
divided as to the most appropriate and effective approach towards Russia. Some
Member States, like France, Italy, Greece and Hungary, promote a pragmatic, instru-
mentalist strategy of constructive engagement, while others, like Poland and Lithu-
ania, advocate a normative agenda and insist on a policy of containment.
The overall conclusion from these points is that the key challenge in defining a new
long-term strategy for the future of EU-Russia relations will be to develop a common
vision for cooperation based on mutually acceptable parameters. In this regard, the
challenge is double, as the EU needs to develop a vision that is shared by its internally
divided Member States, as well as by Russia.
This challenge is very visible when it comes to the implementation of the EU’s
principle of selective engagement. Although the latter fully reflects the spirit of
‘principled pragmatism’, the implementation of this principle turns out to be difficult,
and this is of course in large part because the sanctions regime and the lack of trust
complicate the level of engagement in practice. It is clear that the developments of
the past few months have further revealed how deep the lack of trust between the
EU and Russia is. However, on top of this lack of trust, in the absence of a precise
definition of the selective engagement, it has been very difficult for the EU and its
Member States to agree on the areas that qualify for selective engagement with
Russia. Several EU Member States, including Germany and France, and institutional24
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been proposing specific areas for selective engagement, including the Arctic, the
digital sphere, cooperation with the EAEU, regional infrastructure, and the Northern
Dimension. However, other EU Member States, including Poland and Lithuania, have
been fiercely opposed to extending the areas of selective engagement, mostly
because they lost faith in a cooperative approach towards the Kremlin. These are
mostly EU Member States which, based on their own historical experiences with
Russia, believe that the Ukraine crisis confirmed the failure of a cooperative
approach towards Russia.
To restore trust with Russia, it seems essential to develop a ‘step-by step’ approach
based on confidence-building measures, which – if successfully implemented – could
eventually lead towards broader and longer-term cooperation. In this respect, some
lessons could also be drawn from the EU’s Northern Dimension (ND) policy. The
latter constitutes a pragmatic, multilateral framework for cooperation with Russia
and essentially focuses on issues of ‘low politics’, such as environment protection,
social welfare, transport networks and cultural cooperation. This allowed the ND
policy to succeed in a context of deteriorating bilateral relations.25
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Russia and the EU in the 21st Century Geo-Economics
Over recent years trade and investment flows between Russia and the European
Union showed little positive dynamics. The future depends not only on the duration
of mutual sanctions, but also on a new, fresher view on the vast landscape of our geo-
economic cooperation.
There are three areas of policy effort that need to be addressed.
Untapping the potential of regionalism. The first area lies in launching institutional
dialogue between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the European Union,
primarily between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the European Commis-
sion. The EU maintains political, economic and cultural dialogues with many regional
integration organizations on all continents. Its cooperation with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) spans for almost five decades. According to the EU
External Action Service the European Union and Latin America enjoy privileged
relations of “natural partners, linked by strong historical, cultural and economic ties”.
Regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels of relations prove to be mutually
reinforcing1. Everywhere in its relations with other regions the EU aims to promote
intraregional integration. Russia and its historical partners are the only apparently
selective exclusion.
Until recently, EU officials denied the very possibility of dialogue with the EAEU refer-
ring to its low integration capacity. This explanation looks farfetched if we take into
account the fact that the EU has a long history of framework agreements with the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries – from the Yaoundé Convention of
1963 to the new ‘post-Cotonou’ agreement, initialed in April 2021. Being the poorest
in the world, ACP countries do not form a region or a network. Contrary, the EAEU is
a fully-fledged customs union.
Starting first an informal and later an official bilateral dialogue the EU and the EAEU
will form a new platform for negotiations, putting apart some painful issues in the
present EU-Russia’s relations. Such a dialogue may send a strong positive signal to
political stakeholders in Europe and Eurasia, as well as to their economic agents.
1 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/13042/eu-celac-relations_en26
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discover new solutions to some “hot” geopolitical issues, like the issue of standards
in the global digital market where the EU strives to become a leading rules setter.
The mighty international euro. Since the introduction of the single European
currency, the EU declared that it would not promote the international role of the
euro. The only primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price
stability. European policy makers proceeded from a common assumption that a
stable currency would gradually win a place in the sun for itself. They delicately
shelved a politically sensitive issue of the dollar’s dominance in international trade
and finance.
Approaching its 10-th anniversary, the euro gained tangible results as a key global
currency. It acquired quite visible shares in most segments of international finance.
A half-century European dream to speak with one voice at the international financial
fora came true. However, the global financial turmoil of 2008 and the following euro
area debt crisis have brought to naught previous achievements.
The composite index of the internationalization of the euro (in constant exchange
rates) declined from 23.6 in 2006 to 18.2 in 2017; it bounced to 19.8 in 2019 and
dived again to 19.3 in 2020. From the fourth quarter of 2019 to the fourth quarter of
2020 the share of the euro in international deposits dropped by 3 percentage points
and in foreign currency debt issuance it diminished by 2 percentage points.
At present the euro accounts for 21% in global foreign exchange reserves, 23% in
international debt and 17% in international loans lagging far behind the dollar with
the subsequent shares of 59%, 62% and 54%2. And if previously the EU officials
avoided mentioning the “exorbitant privilege” of the dollar, now this vocabulary has
returned to public discussion.
In December 2018 the European Commission made the first move away from its
previous neutral stance to the euro’s internationalization, adopting its Communica-
tion “Towards a stronger international role of the euro” and a recommendation on
the use of the euro in the field of energy3. The global role of the euro was featured
high on the agenda at the Euro summit on 25 March 2021 while the European
Commission highlights the need for more geopolitical financial sovereignty.
The ongoing preparation to the introduction of the digital euro is one of the ECB’s
tools to construct a new, more balanced international financial framework. Since
autumn 2020 the process chaired by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board
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reserves. At present Russia plays a significant role in using the euro as an invoice
currency in the natural gas trade, and it may play a decisive role in modernizing the
outdated practice of using the dollar as the only invoice currency in oil trade. Another
promising area of common interests – issuance of green bonds. In 2020 euro
accounted for 50% of the overall issuances (including EU issuers) and for 35% of
purely international issuance (by non-residents), while 50% was issued in dollars and
the rest 15% in other currencies.
Noteworthy, during the first years of the euro the ECB and the Bank of Russia estab-
lished close ties, they constantly exchanged information and best practices. Groups
of senior officials and experts shuttled between Neglinnaya street in Moscow and
Kaiserstrasse in Frankfurt am Main. It’s the proper moment to make use of this
legacy and to regenerate cooperation between central bankers.
Constructing common economic language. The digital age today is full of incredible
surprises. One of such surprises is the absence of access to the most fundamental
economic knowledge, literally the ABC of economics. Some essential texts exist only
on paper and are not digitalized, some are digitalized but not available for free access
and many of them are not available in the native language of users. In fact, this area
is strikingly not user-friendly. The challenge is fourfold: copyright, translations,
digitalization and free access.
Let me quote some examples. The seminal book of Bela Balassa “Towards a Theory
of Economic Integration”, 1961 could be downloaded at a price of 42 dollars, or 3000
rubles in Wiley online library4. The price is acceptable for large universities in Russia
but not for individual students. It would be great if the European Parliament or other
European institution redeems copyright and displays this book for the free access for
everybody – in the EU and in its “natural partners, linked by strong historical, cultural
and economic ties”. Translations into Spanish, Italian, Russian or Mandarin will
stimulate cultural cooperation and provide a common basement for economists and
policy makers.
The theoretical basis of the modern central banks’ digital currencies was elaborated
by the German economist Georg Knapp in his breakthrough work “The State Theory
of Money”, 1905. In 1913 the book was translated in Russian and in 1926 – in English.
For the Russian citizens it is nowadays available in one (!) copy in the Russian State
Library in Moscow – in its original old spelling with non-existent letters and myriads
of hard signs. Fortunately, the English edition can be downloaded freely from the
Internet. One can hardly expect that Knapp is available in Hungarian, Latvian,
4 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1961.tb02365.x28
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translated into Russian only in a small fraction.
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union has started to pave way to the
linguistic diversity. This trend is backed by the progress in artificial intelligence and
machine translation and also propelled by the current pandemic. If we use the
moment and give good work to translators in Russia, EU member countries and other
European nations, in several years we will possess a real treasury – a collection of
fundamental texts on economics in dozens of European languages and available for
everybody. This will create a true European economic language with a common
discourse and comprehensible narratives.29
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The relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union find them-
selves politically at a low point. Looking back at the past years, one could state that
both entities have also used the other party as a ‘meaningful other’ in their own
identity building. This us versus them thinking has been discussed by several of the
main speakers. Unnecessary posturing at both sides has further aggravated that situ-
ation. The question which can thus be posed is whether one can look beyond,
towards areas of cooperation and perhaps even partnership in the future. Let us
explore a few routes.
Alexei Gromyko mentioned the European Green Deal. This could very well be an
opportunity for rather than a challenge to the Russian Federation and its relations
with EU countries. European oil demand will in the coming decades, relatively
speaking, further decline. However, natural gas will constitute a ‘bridge fuel’ towards
a renewable energy future. European demand with regard to natural gas is here to
stay for several more decades. Since Russia boasts some of the world’s largest
reserves, the European market will remain lucrative and stable. Natural gas clearly
remains a domain of cooperation. But there are also opportunities in the area of
renewables. Think for instance of the vast amounts of nickel that will be needed in
electric car batteries. In the Russian Federation there exist various producers
amongst which for instance the company Nornickel can be seen as one of the
cheapest producers. Provided environmental sustainability criteria are imple-
mented, such companies could become future producers for the European market.
The same reasoning can be applied to such domains as biomass, if however sustain-
ability criteria are applied. Biomass will become a necessary component for a
sustainable bio-based chemical industry. In return, European countries also have
expertise to offer. Think for instance about energy efficiency or renewable energy
technologies.
As we have been experiencing a global pandemic since the beginning of 2020, there
are clear opportunities to work together with other partners in the world to further
strengthen the multilateral framework regarding health. One could think of early
detection mechanisms for pandemics and strengthening the multilateral expertise in
the world around the World Health Organisation and its multilateral partners.
European and Russian expertise have much to offer in this domain, and could also
learn from each other. This is an area that should be de-politicized as much as
possible.30
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in the areas of culture, education and science. Also non-state actors such as univer-
sities and associations could play a role. It will probably be in this area of science and
innovation diplomacy that advances can be made without jeopardising ongoing polit-
ical tensions. Whether it will be feasible to set up such mechanisms will however
depend upon political will at both sides. It would nevertheless be a much more
productive way of engaging with and challenging each other.
As regards security, one way out could be to re-conceptualise security in the pan-
European area. All too often, security is limited to mere ‘defence matters’. However,
our mutual security depends not merely upon an absence of violence, or a reduction
in a mutual mistrust, but also upon the way security is conceptualised and tackled
policy-wise. If once applies a ‘broader definition’ of security, then one would realize
that there also exists, next to ‘military security’, an ‘economic security’, ‘energy
security’, ‘environmental security’, etc. In each of these domains, one could imagine
projects which are mutually beneficial, much like the Helsinki process in the 1970s
tried to stimulate another paradigm to try to escape the us vs. them-thinking. Again,
political will is needed on both sides for this to succeed.
There is however one domain which demands some more urgent attention: cyber
security. Cyber threats have the capacity in this highly technological world to under-
mine mutual trust. One could think of an instrument whereby an information
exchange mechanism is created and/or attempts are being made to create a safer
cyberspace. Given the level of mutual mistrust that exists between both parties in
this domain, this will not be easy. It could however be a milestone for a better future
relationship.
There are also the ‘geopolitical elephants in the room’; issues of major geopolitical
contention between East and West. Let us name one; the Ukraine. Also amongst
some Western academics and politicians, there exists an acknowledgement that
mistakes were made. Some of those issues have been dealt with in earlier confer-
ences. This is not to say that they agree with the ‘ultimate Russian solution’, such as
what happened in the Crimea. Can we dial back on the events of 2014? There should
be room for a much more nuanced debate on both sides, and an attempt to circum-
vent the current political stalemate. Through confidence building measures very
gradual technical steps could be made. One important aspect could be to very gradu-
ally create a more positive geo-economics between East and West. Perhaps both
Brussels and Moscow have seen countries such as the Ukraine as an extension of
their own geo-economic neighbourhood. Instead of both “forcing” countries such as
the Ukraine to choose between both, also another geo-economic future is imagi-
nable. This is a future in which Kiev or regions in the Ukraine can freely engage in
trade and innovation with East and West as they see fit. The crux of the problem then
lies in how the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union deal with each31
HOW TO REVERSE IN A ONE WAY-STREETother. Perhaps in the area of technical standards, some form of indirect cooperation
is imaginable. If these technical standards, far away from high politics, could gradu-
ally converge, this would at least constitute one hurdle less. Countries such as the
Ukraine and others could become meeting places instead of zones of confrontation
between economic models. Such a geo-economic approach will over time also affect
the geopolitical relations between East and West. This is not to deny that funda-
mental differences between both models will not persist. Rather it suggests that
thinking ‘outside of the box’ would be more beneficial for all involved in the longer
run.
Last but not least, and further building upon the ideas above, both the European
Union and the Russian Federation find themselves in a world which is in flux both
geo-economically and geopolitically. Because of demographic and technological
changes, as well as a growing power competition between the US and China, they
have to re-invent themselves and their places on the global scene. This, in my
opinion, will spur a more pragmatic approach to the debate about their respective
places in world politics. A bipolar world re-organised around the US and China
would in fact not be in the interest of the European Union nor of the Russian Feder-
ation. A careful and pragmatic balancing politics could very well be much more
productive for both entities. In such an approach, both Brussels and Moscow,
identify what they can achieve with whom, based upon their own interests. In some
areas they could cooperate, in others they would not. But at least they could both
play a role in world politics and maintain a multipolar system that perhaps would be
much more in tune with their own interests than the bipolar US-China competition
which currently seems to be in the making. The time may not be right just yet for such
analyses, but at least they deserve to be studied and further debated.32
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The metaphor of reversing in a one-way street is telling. The one-way street, which
is in this case a way to ever growing confrontation between the EU and Russia, is
framed by certain rules that all traffic participants are to respect whether they like
them or not. Yet, there are also certain loopholes that can be exploited to change the
direction of individual cars (in this case these are cases of selective engagement). And
if more and more traffic participants choose to make use of the loopholes, new rules
for the whole system might emerge in the longer run. This paper will first outline
some general tendencies of the EU-Russian relationship, then it will touch upon cases
of selective engagement and close by recommending how the ‘loopholes’ can be
used.
Five long-term trends characterize the EU-Russian relationship (or the road that this
relationship takes) at the moment. They emerged long before the 2014 conflict in
Ukraine; but that conflict made those tendencies more explicit.
1. Both the EU and Russia believe that time is on their side. Brussels expects internal
changes in Russia, which will result from profound economic problems and aging
political elite. Moscow, in turn, sees international relations as increasingly chaotic
and believes that profound changes are at work that will undermine the positions
of the West. That predisposes both sides to the wait-and-see approach.
2. The EU and Russia do not have (or at least, to not feel) any existential need for
cooperation. Even the pandemic crisis did not produce a rapprochement
between the EU and Russia. Rather the pandemic led to more entrenched posi-
tions, and reaffirmed stereotypes on both sides.
3. None of the sides has a long-term plan for their relations. The EU demands
change in the Russian international behavior before going back to ‘the business
as usual’ while Russian representatives stress that they do not want any business
as usual. The EU insists on relations based on values, Russia demands equality.
But none of the sides suggest any clear substantive long-term goal of coopera-
tion.
4. Both sides gain internally from the present situation. Confrontation with the EU
and the West is an important factor of Russia’s domestic policy. But equally it is
key for the EU’s consolidation in its external policy. Thus the argument that none
of the sides has anything to gain from the confrontation should be taken with a
grain of salt.33
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ship. Russia is concerned with its equality vis-à-vis the West and the EU; it wishes
the others to recognize its right to decide on how norms and principles are to be
applied to specific situations. The EU for its part would like to preserve not only
the values (of democracy, human rights, the rule of law) but also its position of
the key agent of these values. The discussion on international law vs. rules-based
order, and wider – on the inability of the EU and Russia to agree on the same
language reveal this very status conflict.
Yet, despite these rules that condition a one-way road to confrontation, there are
things that can be done. Cases of selective engagement, to use the EUs terminology,
can be identified in various fields. Politically, the EU and Russia have a lot to gain from
cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal, on the Middle East peace process, on Syria.
Some coordination is clearly needed in the CIS area. Economically, the EU and Russia
need to cooperate on the Green Deal, which will fundamentally reshape EU-Russian
economic relations in the medium-to-long term. In particular, there is a huge poten-
tial in cooperation on energy efficiency, hydrogen production, public awareness
campaigns. The EU and Russia stand to gain a lot from further dialogue on technical
standards, accreditation and certification. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) still
looks into EU standards and the EU learns from Russia’s method of products control
in the market. The Arctic might gain from cooperation between the EU and Russia.
The EU and Russia should cooperate in providing vaccination to the developing
countries; the scope of this task requires pooling of all available resources. There are
clear gains from research and education cooperation, from the dialogue of civil
society.
Yet, the devil is in the details. Politically Russia is sensitive to cooperation on the CIS
area whereas the EU is wary of the ‘astanisation’ of conflict-resolution, to quote J.
Borrell, that is of Russia and Turkey sidelining the EU in a bid to resolve or freeze
some conflicts. The issue of non-recognition plays an important role in economic
area: the EU does not recognize the Eurasian Economic Union whereas Russia does
not see the EU as an Arctic actor. Cooperation on fighting pandemic and on aligning
standards is ‘infected’ by systemic features, outlined above. Cooperation on the
Green Deal is constrained, on the one hand, by over-compliance of EU companies
and banks with sanctions against Russia, and, on the other hand, by the rhetoric that
the Green Deal can help the EU to ease its energy dependence on Russia. Russia, for
its part, poorly engages with the EU’s efforts to shift to renewables, not taking these
initiatives seriously. Finally, there is a tendency to geopoliticize civil society dialogue.
The EU is concerned about government-sponsored NGOs of Russia, many member
states are wary about cyber attacks, some leaders even suggest banning all Russian
citizens from the EU. On the Russian side growing restrictions on foreign finance, on
NGOs and societal activism also limit cooperation in this field.34
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improve their relations. In order to maximize the output, the following things should
be done.
1. The EU and Russia should restore at least some institutions that were frozen
following the 2014 crisis. These institutions (sectoral dialogues, and Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement structures first and foremost) will allow solving
some burning issues when crises arise; they also will provide a venue for mutual
socialization, which will lead to better understanding of each other.
2. Cooperation should involve experts and professionals rather than politicians and
MFA supervisors. That will minimize politicization of selective engagement.
3. Mass media messages should not substitute the substance of cooperation (as it
happened, for example, with the visit of Josep Borrell in Moscow in February
2021). Shielding this cooperation from the limelight at the early stage will help
avoid black-and-white conceptualization. On the other hand, positive cases of
cooperation should be shared widely.
4. Cases of selective engagement should not be automatically conceptualized in a
zero-sum logics. Russia is frequently quick at pointing out that no problem can be
solved without its participation; the EU for itself tends to emphasize immediately
alignment with its vision in the world. Both approaches, however, eventually lead
to the zero-sum conceptualization.
5. The EU and Russia should avoid issue linkages in selective engagement. Rather
individual cases should lead to mutual socialization and, in the long run, enhance-
ment of trust.
6. The EU and Russia will need to agree on some language, on how they understand
at least a limited number of categories, at the very least in relation to selective
engagement. That will help to minimize simplistic conceptualization.
Working on small issues seems at present the only way to slow-down the rush to
further EU-Russian confrontation. This bottom-up approach will not reverse the one-
direction movement. But it could create in the medium-term conditions for this
reversal.35
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It seems that Russia-EU relations have reached recently the peak of the tree, i.e. the
point at which it becomes more and more difficult and inconvenient to keep its posi-
tions and the danger to fall from the tree seems quite a real one. Both sides declare
the wish to change the situation, but no one wants to lose its face and to make the
first step.
If we imagine what “climbing down the tree” in practice means and what we need to
make it possible, we have to start with the recognition that we both want each other
to climb down safely. It would mean that we don’t want each other to fall from the
tree and we need to be sure that the process of climbing down will not destroy our
integrity (we won’t broke our head, hand or leg, i.e. we will not be injured). This
confidence seems to be the first and the most important precondition to start the
process.
For Russia-EU relations this is the first and crucial step: to recognize and to voice it
publicly that each of the sides doesn’t what the other one to be damaged,
destroyed or feel insecure. At the moment the situation is quite the opposite, as
soon as each side believes that the goal of the other is to make harm to its opponent.
A lot of mutually detrimental myths illustrate the fears of this type. Russia’s author-
ities and many experts as well perceive NATO’s enlargement as a main threat to
Russia’s security and they do really believe that EU’s final goal is a regime change in
Russia. Current discussions on Ukraine and Georgia’s entering NATO are perceived
as security threat. The same is fair about the new EU’s discussion on the principles of
dealing with Russia, one of which is about strengthening of its interaction with
Russia’s so-called civil society. There is a lack of understanding in the EU that its
support for Russia’s so-called opposition (or those groups that support Navalny) will
be viewed positively only in a very limited circle of Russian citizens and will only
convince Russian authorities to continue its pressure on protestors and perceived
opponents. Russian society doesn’t perceive the examples of “democratization” in
post-soviet countries as success-stories, but more like political destabilization and
economic collapse. This fact works counter EU efforts to help Russian civil society to
become more mature.
The EU discourse on strengthening of member states’ resilience against the
backdrop of Russia’s hybrid warfare, cyber attacks and other types of interference is
another confirmation that the EU believes that Russia is really going to destroy the
EU or destabilize some of the member states.36
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confrontational discourse on values. Russia’s authorities and a part of the society
believe that the EU with its liberal approach represent a real danger to Russia’s tradi-
tional values and specific model of development. The very thesis that Russia belongs
to the European civilization is highly debatable even in the official political
discourse5, the value cleavages are growing and the identity issues are more and
more often becoming the reasons for disputes, grievances and misunderstanding6.
Looking from Russia it seems that there is a competition in the EU, especially among
the East-European countries, for the best new interpretation of the results of the
Second World War and USSR’s role in it, constant search for new identities and
revision of historical events. On the other side, the EU accuses Russia of the support
of nationalist and authoritarian parties and movements inside its member states.
As far as these concerns and fears are not eliminated there will be no serious steps
forward. There are two available instruments to help each other to get rid of these
mutually horrifying myths. The first one is changing discourse and trying to convince
each other in having no intensions to make the opponent to fall from the tree.
The second one is to avoid creating new myths and horrors. The best example of
this emerging new horror is EU’s agenda on green energy transformation which can
become either a first common step to climb down the tree or just another one
reason to stay where we are, i.e. at the top of the tree with less and less strength
to keep the safe positions.
Green energy transformation is widely perceived in Russia like a new instrument for
the EU to get rid of its dependence on Russia’s hydrocarbons and deprive Russia of
its natural competitiveness and main source of budget revenues7. At the same time
the recent Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly8 and the speech for the Global
Climate Summit9 stressed that there is an option to convert this new potential
threat for Russia into cooperation opportunity. In his previous Address of 202010
Putin claimed for the UN Security Council permanent members to hold a summit
aiming to try to solve any of common security problems. This time he stresses that
common climate change can be considered such a problem. After his visit to Moscow
Josep Borrell has concluded that Russia is no longer interested in constructive
5 Russia Is a ‘Distinct Civilization,’ Putin Says. The Moscow Times, May 18, 2020. https://www.themoscow-
times.com/2020/05/18/russia-is-a-distinct-civilization-putin-says-a70295
6 Malinova O. Obsession with status and ressentiment: Historical backgrounds of the Russian discursive iden-
tity construction. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 47 (2014), p. 291-303. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.07.001
7 Romanova T. Russia’s political discourse on the EU’s energy transition (2014-2019) and its effect on EU-
Russia energy relations. Energy Policy 154 (2021) 112309. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112309
8 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, April 21, 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/
65418
9 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65425
10 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 15 January, 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/6258237
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cooperation be it Syrian reconstruction or cooperation on climate change. Thus,
global responsibility that Russia strives to demonstrate should definitely be consid-
ered as a window of opportunities to make this first step to climb down together.
New green transformation can become such a window of opportunities.
If the EU really wants to convince Russia than it doesn’t want this new green deal to
become detrimental for Russia, Brussels needs to start cooperation on decarboni-
zation together with Russian companies and not only in Russia, but in many other
regions as well. Russian and EU companies could start this cooperation in those
countries where they are partners already. For example, in the Mediterranean. As
soon as the EU has already declared its new strategies for Africa and for the Mediter-
ranean and allocated a huge amount of money for these new types of cooperation,
it seems highly probable that the EU southern neighbors will accept the new cooper-
ation proposal. In this case to enter new energy projects in Mediterranean together
with the EU companies and companies of those countries which will embark on
green transition, Russian companies will have no choice except for following the new
“green” rules of the game. It will mean for Russia to become a rule-taker, not a rule-
maker.
Thus, there are two options. High ecological standards of technologies applied in
international cooperation projects in energy field can become a new instrument of
the “selection” of partners and sidelining those of them who is not considered
“environmentally responsible” enough. Or these new ecological standards can
become a new version of “partnership for modernization” that took place a decade
ago – this time with no political clout, but with the ambitions of global responsibility
and overcoming mutual grievances for the benefits of all. “Partnership for sustain-
able globalization” could become a practical depoliticized cooperation area that
could help to embark on moving closer to each other without losing faces and could
help to avoid zero-sum interaction model.
Thus, green energy transformation could become either a chance to start climbing
down together or just another attempt to make the one who is weaker to fall from
the tree.38
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Reversing is a vital step. Yet, what good does it do if one loses sight of the crossroads
or traffic lights to come? Once the Putin-generation has left the Kremlin, who will
follow in their footsteps? And how should the European Union prepare to seize
opportunities that might accompany this generational change?
Todays tense relationship between the EU and the Russian Federation is not the
result of a single escalatory moment. Rather, it is an accumulation of incremental
steps downward. On the one hand, the EU has failed to develop a fitting Russia policy
due to competing national interests and a lack of understanding of what drives
Russia. On the other hand, the Russian Federations confrontational behavior speaks
for itself. If the EU wants to strive for a more fruitful relationship with its Eastern
neighbor, it should focus on gradual improvements and prepare itself by looking
beyond the Putin-era. In what follows, I will elaborate on opportunities the EU could
tap into in the process of generational change on the Russian political scene.
The analysis departs from two assumptions. First, considering the difficult relations
between the EU and Russia, it serves to zoom in on low-threshold confidence-
building measures, such as the economic and cultural/educational spheres. Second,
it also presupposes that the Russian political landscape will evolve incrementally
rather than change radically.
Okay, Boomer
Putin and his inner circle spent its formative years in the Soviet Union, where opposi-
tion to the West was a key constituent of USSR policy and identity. Today, this leader-
ship continues to treat the West as an adversary. One can debate whether the
Kremlins rhetoric on Russian insecurity and the threat of Western aggression is a
genuine concern or an instrument of legitimation, and the truth is probably
somewhere in the middle. Unfortunately, as the Thomas theorem states, things do
not have to be real to have real consequences.
But how long will the current Russian leadership stay in power? Despite whispers
that Putin is looking for ways to leave the presidency while ensuring his freedom and
privileges, he will realistically remain in office until 2036. Yet, Putin ages and will
eventually leave his post, and a next generation will come to power. And with this,
change might come.39
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What opportunities could this change offer? Nobody starts with a clean slate.
Whoever comes into power will inherit a broad range of unresolved issues, and
problems such as corruption and cronyism will persevere. Nonetheless, this genera-
tion did not spend its formative years under the shadow of the nuclear annihilation
of the height of the Cold War. And when the anti-Western stance makes way for
more opportunistic behavior, opportunities arise.
If the EU plays its hand well, it has a real chance for a more constructive and
pragmatic relationship. So let us think creatively about how it can make the most of
this crack in the economic door. First of all, it can offer a more attractive alternative
to cooperation with China in a broad range of fields. I argue that the economic sphere
has the lowest threshold. While the current relationship between the Russian Feder-
ation and China is currently mutually beneficial, the scales are slowly tilting in Chinas
favor. No longer conducting like Tchaikovsky, Russia will increasingly fiddle away on
the second violin. As a result of Chinas increasingly assertive behavior, the time will
come when Russia has to choose between becoming a junior partner to its Southern
neighbor or building a pragmatic relationship with the EU. Economic cooperation
might be the lowest-threshold way to highlight the attractiveness of a (re)turn to the
EU.
Another possibility is to consider drawing upon the Russian diaspora living in the EU
to strengthen EU-Russia economic ties. While exact figures are unknown, the Russian
diaspora in the EU constitutes at least three million people. Apart from individuals
having left the USSR, the past decades have been marked by a brain drain from
Russia to EU member states due to political, social and economic circumstances.
Many members of this diaspora have reached high-level positions in companies with
an international orientation. They are thus very well-placed to interact with compa-
nies and government in the Russian Federation, ensure mutual understanding and
assist in establishing economic ties between Russia and the EU. This angle is
especially promising if Russia would at the same time undergo a modernisation of its
economy to tap into its full potential. After all, the country has enormous potential
in the markets of technology and engineering, which could easily be a basis for
increased economic cooperation with the EU.
The Millennials: from mutual understanding to cooperation
Beyond economics, a second sphere is the cultural/educational one. Here, EU
member states should increase their engagement with the younger Russian genera-
tions, starting today. Increasingly educated and vocal, they are proud of their country
but also want to defend living standards, rule of law and freedom of speech.40
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common speech. Indeed, while Russia and the EU generally use the same concept
when talking about specific issue, these concepts differ in meaning. This ranges from
the concept of a great power over democracy and foreign interference to hybrid
warfare. If the EU wants to build a long-term productive relationship with the Russian
Federation, it is imperative to develop a shared language. This does not equal
pushing our own interpretation on the other or vice versa. Rather, it entails creating
common understanding and appreciation, both of which are vital for a fruitful future
relationship.
Promoting engagement and common understanding can be a very grassroots initia-
tive. This means that the EU can continue these initiatives even if it wants to wield a
stick approach towards the Kremlin. Valuable initiatives could include but should not
be limited to educational exchanges, joint youth policy forums, language centres and
travel opportunities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the EU should definitely focus on how to get out of the deep pit EU-
Russia relations find themselves in now. Yet, it should not simply think about how to
reverse today but should also be careful not to lose sight of what tomorrow may
bring. Many approaches have already been tried towards Putin and the Kremlin in
the past decades. Almost all fall short, either due to lack of unity within the EU, or
due to the character of Russias current regime. But future generations have been
shaped by different circumstances. They thus may have different identities, drivers
and goals. The EU should remain aware of this and prepare itself to grasp any oppor-
tunities that might come along with this generational change.41
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